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INTRODUCTION

The primary purpose for the formation of the United Nations was to
save "succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our
lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind".! In this context, the most
significant development in the latter half of the twentieth century has been the
regulation of the use of force and right of States to wage war. The corollary
development as a result of this regulation has been invocation of the age old
doctrine of self-defence and the emergence of a controversial debate as to the
limits of this doctrine. Another interesting aspect of this debate is that it has
time and again been contended that maters of self-preservation and security of
the State are not subject matters of International law.
The purpose of this paper is to establish that the concept of 'anticipatory
self-defence' falls within the justifiable limits of 'self-defence' as enshrined
under Art. 51 of UN Charter. The justification stems from the need to give a
dynamic interpretation to Art. 51 in light of the recent developments in science
and technology which has resulted in States possessing nuclear arms capable
of complete destruction of other States in no time.
SELF-DEFENCE

- HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE

It has been opined by many that self-defence is an inherent and automatic right. The naturalist doctrine of Grotius was that:right of self-defence has its origins directly and chiefly in the fact
nature committed to each other of his protection.2
This view is reflected in the UN Charter as to make self-defence
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inherent right. 3 The authoritative interpretation of self-defence was given in
the Nicaragua Case (Merits).4 It has been held that:Art. 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there
is a 'natural' or 'inherent' right of self-defence and it is hard to
see how this can be other than of customary nature, even if the
present content has been confirmed and influenced by the Charter.5

If the UN Charter reinforces the customary law on 'self-defence',
let us examine the same prior to the Charter.
The Caroline Case

then

(1837l

The case involved an American ship 'Caroline' which was sunk by Great
Britain on the ground of self-defence. The test evolved by the then American
Secretary of State Daniel Webster popularly known as the 'Webster Doctrine'
has commonly been accepted as indicating when the pre-UN Charter, customary international law right of self-defence could be exercised.? The j ustification for such an action is that there was necessity for self-defence which was
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. This right is however not unqualified. An attack which is made in selfdefence must necessarily be proportional and not excessive.
Further, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty for Reunification of War in 1928
recognised that self preservation was an inherent right to States under customary international law.
AGGRESSION

- AN OVERVIEW

Since the right of self-defence is dependent on occurrence or imminent
threat of 'armed attack', understanding of the same is necessary. The concept
of warfare has undergone a drastic transformation in the modern day ever
since Quincy Wright defined it after the Dumberton Oaks Conference. It has a
character of ambiguity that Greenwood describes as 'confusion'.8 In recent
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times States do not employ the traditional means of war but employ terrorism
and insurgency in their proxy wars. Moore has gone to the extent of calling it
"politically
invisible aggression".9
The International
Court in the Nicaragua Case (Merits)lO has held that
197411 must be held to be
the Resolution
on the Definition of Aggression,
customary international
law on what amounts to 'armed attack'. The General
Assembly had favoured a mixed definition of aggression and had laid down a
list of acts by way of example to illustrate the concept of 'aggression'.
Art. 1 of the resolution

defines aggression

as follows:-

Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence
of another.
Art. 3 provides that invasions or attack by armed forces of a State,
military occupation
as a result of invasion or attack, annexation
by use of
force, blockade of ports or coasts of a State, and the sending of armed bands,
groups or mercenaries
or a substantial
involvement
therein by the sending
State in bombing by these people would amount to aggression.
Both the International Law Commission12 and jurist Brownlie13 have supported
the view in Art. 3 of the General Assembly Resolution. In an attempt to restrict the meaning, Antonio Cassesse has argued that for a terrorist attack and
activities
to fall within the definition of 'aggression',
the same should be
consistent and not sporadic or isolated.14
The importance of this definition need not be stressed as it is the only
means by which State can justify the exercise its right of self-defence.
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Charter by virtue of Art. 51 has incorporated the customary principle given by
the Webster doctrine in the Coroline Case .15
On the one hand we have eminent jurists like the former I.C.J. President
Philip C. Jessup ruling out the right to anticipatory self-defence by arguing
that an alarming military preparation by a neighbouring State would only justify a resort to the Security Council but not a resort to force.16 This view has
been supported later in the 1960s when, this debate was revived in light of the
'Cuban Missile Crisis' and the embargo by the United States on the ports of
Cuba by Prof. Quincy Wright by stating that
Obligation of States to refrain from threats to peace under Art.
2(4) and competence of the UN to take actions in case of threat to
peace under Art. 39 were not intended to give a unilateral right to
military self-defence in case of such threats. For that reason, self
defence against threats were excluded in Art. 51 and States were
explicitly advised and obliged to submit disputes or situations which
they think threaten peace, to the UN and refrain from unilateral
use of force. 17
Disagreement with the above stance was first voiced by Morten Kaplan
and the former Secretary of State of U.S. Katzenbach who argued that such a
stance was futile in an atomic and nuclear age.18
Further, the former LC.J. President Humphry Waldock also disagreed
with Jessup and argued that the drafters of the Charter did not intend to cut
down the right of self defence beyond the scope of the Webster doctrine in the
Caroline Case.19 He opined that where there was convincing evidence not
merely of threats or danger but of an armed attack being actually mounted,
then an armed attack may be said to have occurred it had not passed the
frontiers.2o

Waldock's view was further extended rightly by Prof. Myres Macdougal
who stated that there was no prohibition against the use of force in anticipatory self-defence. He argued that:"Nothing on the plain and natural meaning of the words of the
Charter require an interpretation that Art. 51 restricts the custom-

17
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ary right of self-defence.
The proponents of such an interpretation substitute for the words "if an armed attack occurs" the very
different words "if and only if' an armed allack occurs."21
Macdougal
further argued that, self-defence
was legal under international law even if pre-emptive
in nature, provided that the force used was
proportionate
and proper in intensity and magnitude to secure the objective of
self-defence
under the established conditions of necessity.22

defence

The above arguments supporting the right of States to anticipatory
has been tacitly recognised by the world community.23

ANTICIPATORY

SELF

DEFENCE

- VIEW

UNDER

ARTICLE

self

2(4)

Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter is a general bar against the use of force.
Under this provision States are required to refrain from the threat or use of
force against the political independence
and territorial sovereignty
of other
States. Anthony D' Amato has analysed the above in light of the Israeli air
attack and the consequent destruction of Iraqi Nuclear reactors in 1983.24 He
argues that Israeli attack on Iraq was justified since neither the political independence nor territorial integrity of Iraq was taken away, even though there
was a transboundary
attack by Israeli as:a)

No portion

of Iraq was taken away by the bombardment

b)

The Israeli action is analogous to a limited humanitarian
tion which can be justified on similar lines.25

and
interven-

Thus the Israeli action was sought to be justified on the basis of the
above two propositions.
The arguments are valid as the very fact of Iraq possessing a nuclear reactor in an already unstable region of political uncertainty
was itself a threat to Israeli existence and their polilical integrity. Second, the
intervention
was humanitarian as a strike by Iraq by using its nuclear capabilities would lead to a cruel end of the whole lot of Israelis.
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The second part of Art. 2(4) mandates that the use of force must not be
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Macdougal and Feliciano
suggest three factors to see whether actions involving the claim of anticipatory
self-defence are inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.26
a) Extension

or Conservation

If the attack made in self-defence is only for conserving that State's
values rather than extending them by acquisition or destruction of the
values held by the opposition, then it would be legitimateY Israel merely
wanted to check possible nuclear proliferation.
b) Degree of consequentiality
This factor is of extraordinary significance in the present day context. It
has its foundations in the principle that there is hardly a more fundamental value than the preservation of the lives of the inhabitants of the
claimant State. The existence of the State itself is in jeopardy. Thus
Israel may have been justified in attacking a nuclear reactor but not a
plant manufacturing tanks and artillery. Therefore there is a requirement
of drawing a qualitative line between conventional and nuclear capabilities is so far as Art. 2(4) is concerned.28
c) Inclusivity

or exclusivity of Israel's objectives

The question posed is as to how the action of Israel would be in conformity with the purposes of the UN. It is enumerated in the Charter that
one of the purposes of the UN through the General Assembly is under
Art. 11, concerning disarmaments .and regulation of armaments. Art. 26
concerns with the Security Council duty to promote international peace
and security. The Charter is not exclusive as it is also understood that
nuclear proliferation and the weapons constitute the gravest threat ever
faced. International stability is compromised every time there is anew
acquisition.29

The actions of Israel may be confused with the prohibited act of reprisals. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between defence and reprisal. Bowett30
26
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27
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82 Columbia Law Review 1110,1118 (1982).
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gives the illustration of this by guerilla activities being carried out by State A
against State B. The continuous acts provoke State B to destroy these camps
from where guerilla activities are being carried out. A strict construction of
Art. 51 would not permit self-defence as it req uires actual armed attack. It is
opined that it would be an inadequate interpretation. It is unrealistic and it
was never the intention to prevent the concept of anticipatory self-defence.31
CONCLUSION

The two interpretations on the scope of the right to self-defence of States
under International law could be classified as restrictive and expansive interpretations. The former tries to interpret Art. 51 narrowly and has erroneously
understood that the UN Charter is a total prohibition on the use of the same
under all conditions as undesirable. The expansive interpretation sees to reconcile Art. 51 with the customary international law and realizes that force could
be legitimately used for achieving certain noble and predominant purposes.
The school also realises that the use of force might be the only solution in
certain circumstances. State practice seems to justify the above stance.
A State seeking defence under the expansive interpretation would have
to show the following conditions specified by Art. 51 and customary international law are complied with:
a)

Necessity

b)

Proportionately and

c)

Evidence of impending strike.

Art. 51 requires that the 'victim State' report to the Security Council of
the existence of an armed attack on it. This 'obligation' has not found enough
support to be termed 'mandatory'. 32 In cases involving anticipatory self-defence declaration as to the existence of circumstances justifying the exercise
of this defence can obviously be made only after the right has l)een exercised.
The criticism that since the determination of the circumstances justifying the
exercise of the right of anticipatory self-defence is made by the claimant State
alone, it would lead to abuse of the concept, applies equally to the traditional
doctrine of self defence also and the international community has always indulged only in a post-mortem analysis to fix responsibility.
The impotency of the United Nations to prevent nations from breaching
peace and its inability to take positive action to protect interests of a State

31

See USSR action on Czechoslovakia
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Supra
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op.cir. (1972).
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which are infringed upon by another State greatly dilute the prohibition on the
use of force by States.
This is an era where the mere pressing of a button could result in the
anhiliation of over half the world by nuclear weapons and missiles, the right of
anticipatory self-defence becomes indispensible. Would it not be ridiculous to
argue that States must wait for the missiles to cross their borders before exercising their right to self-defence? The restrictive interpretation to the right of
self-defence is an anachronism in the present day context and has outlived its
utility. The time has come to give the restrictive interpretation a burial as it
threatens the very existence of States and perhaps international law also which
cannot survive without States.

